2015
Proceedings

Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law
May 19th, 10:45 AM

Two Challenges of Stealthy Hypervisors Detection: Time Cheating
and Data Fluctuations
Igor Korkin
National Research Nuclear University Moscow Engineering & Physics Institute (NRNU MEPhI),
Department of Cryptology and Discrete Mathematics, Russia, igor.korkin@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl
Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, Computer Law Commons, Defense and Security
Studies Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, Information Security Commons,
National Security Law Commons, OS and Networks Commons, Other Computer Sciences Commons, and
the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Korkin, Igor, "Two Challenges of Stealthy Hypervisors Detection: Time Cheating and Data Fluctuations"
(2015). Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law. 7.
https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl/2015/tuesday/7

This Peer Reviewed Paper is brought to you for free and
open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Annual ADFSL
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

(c)ADFSL

TWO CHALLENGES OF STEALTHY HYPERVISORS
DETECTION: TIME CHEATING AND DATA FLUCTUATIONS
Igor Korkin
National Research Nuclear University Moscow Engineering & Physics Institute (NRNU MEPhI)
Department of Cryptology and Discrete Mathematics
Moscow, 115409, Russia
igor.korkin@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
Hardware virtualization technologies play a significant role in cyber security. On the one hand these
technologies enhance security levels, by designing a trusted operating system. On the other hand these
technologies can be taken up into modern malware which is rather hard to detect. None of the existing
methods is able to efficiently detect a hypervisor in the face of countermeasures such as time cheating,
temporary self-uninstalling, memory hiding etc. New hypervisor detection methods which will be
described in this paper can detect a hypervisor under these countermeasures and even count several nested
ones. These novel approaches rely on the new statistical analysis of time discrepancies by examination of
a set of instructions, which are unconditionally intercepted by a hypervisor. Reliability was achieved
through the comprehensive analysis of the collected data despite its fluctuation. These offered methods
were comprehensively assessed in both Intel and AMD CPUs.
Keywords: hypervisor threat, rootkit hypervisor, nested hypervisors, instruction execution time, statistics
and data analysis, Blue Pill.

1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays successful malware detection is
becoming increasingly important, because
malware cyber-attacks can result in financial,
reputational, process and other losses. We can
overcome these risks only through anticipatory
development of advanced cyber security solutions.
Intel and AMD have released more advanced
CPUs with hardware virtualization support, which
runs code directly on top of the physical hardware.
This privileged code is named Virtual Machine
Monitor (VMM), bare-metal hypervisor or just
“hypervisor”. A hypervisor with a secure system
monitor functions allows us to run multiple OSes
at the same time in one PC, (see Figure 1). As a
result this architecture maximizes the hardware
utilization and reduces the costs of operation. This
is an obvious advantage of hardware virtualization
based hypervisors (Derock, 2009; Barrett, &
Kipper, 2010). At present more than a billion

processors with this technology are installed in
workstations as well as in cloud computing servers
on the Internet.
However, at the same time hardware virtualization
technology increases vulnerability of systems,
seeing that rootkit hypervisor with backdoor
functionality can be planted in the PC (BenYehuda, 2013). This type of rootkits is also knows
as Hardware-based Virtual Machine Rootkit
(HVM rootkit).
The cyber security community faces the challenge
of hypervisor detection. Presently there is no
built-in tool to detect a hypervisor reliably. Of
course we can check basic things: CR4.VMXE
(Intel, 2014) bit in Intel case or EFER.SVME bit
in AMD case (AMD, 2013), but a hypervisor can
hide its original value. Moreover, it is impossible
to block, stop or unload a hypervisor by using
existing known cyber security tools, resides on
virtualized OS level.
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Figure 1 PC without Hypervisor and under Control of the Two Nested Hypervisors:
a Legitimate one and Rootkit
The difficulties of this challenge arise from the
following causes. Firstly hypervisors can use a
wide variety of different techniques to prevent
detection. Secondly, it is possible to run several
nested hypervisors. Thirdly, a hypervisor can be
installed via a driver or boot records as well as
via BIOS (Kovah, Kallenberg, Butterworth, &
Cornwell, 2014) or UEFI (Bulygin, Loucaides,
Furtak, Bazhaniuk, & Matrosov, 2014), which
makes the deleting of a hypervisor rather
difficult.
Utin (2014) analyzed the possibility of
BIOS-based hypervisor threat. The author’s
ideas are based on the suspicious hypervisor
(Russian Ghost) whose detection is simple,
because it does not apply any countermeasures.
Despite the fact that hardware virtualization is
not new and involves a world-wide community
of researchers, the development of effective
hypervisor detection methods has so far been
without success.
The goal of this paper is to tackle this issue. This
article presents new detection methods which are
based on the difference between the instructions
execution time (IET) both, with a hypervisor and
without it. We applied a set of specific
instructions
which
cause
VM-exits
unconditionally or are trapped by a hypervisor.
As a result, IET takes significantly more time
with a hypervisor than without any hypervisor.

This time discrepancy is commonly used to
detect hypervisors. However, detection by time
is possible only if a hypervisor is not hiding
itself via timestamp cheating (Fritsch, 2008;
Garfinkel, Adams, Warfield, & Franklin, 2007)
or via a temporary self-uninstalling hypervisor –
the Blue Chicken technique (Rutkowska, &
Tereshkin, 2007). Under these conditions the
hypervisor detection methods based on time
discrepancies will not work. Therefore, a totally
new hypervisor detection approach, which is
resilient to countermeasures, is needed.
In a nutshell the proposed methods consider
the IET as a random variable, whose properties
depend on hypervisor presence. That is why by
applying probabilistic and statistical methods to
IET, it may be possible to detect a hypervisor.
Our detection methods have improved on the
current time-based detection method, which uses
unconditionally intercepted instructions. Unlike
the original method our approach is able to
detect any stealthy hypervisor, which has
applied
countermeasures:
time-cheating,
temporary self-uninstalling etc. This is a distinct
advantage of these new methods.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 is devoted to the analysis of
the most popular software and hardware
hypervisor detection approaches. The analysis
will be given in the case of a hypervisor using

countermeasures to prevent its detection, such as
time cheating, temporary self-uninstalling,
preventing memory dump acquisition etc.
Section 3 contains the processor behavior
analysis in the three cases without a hypervisor,
with one and several nested hypervisors.
Analysis has discovered new useful statistics for
the IET, which can reveal hypervisors.
In section 4 the experimental results of statistics
examination are presented. The positive results
of these checks make it possible to analyze IET
as a random variable. As a result this allows us
to use threshold values of statistics to detect each
hypervisor. This approach works well under the
countermeasures and fluctuations of measured
time durations. The present author’s threshold
generated methods and hypervisor detection
approaches and their analysis are briefly
presented.
Section 5 contains the main conclusions and
further research directions.
2. RELATED WORK
Nowadays there is no hypervisor detection
build-in tool for Intel. The built-in tool for AMD
CPU
is
vulnerable
to
hypervisor

countermeasures. Therefore researchers are
working hard to solve this challenge. This paper
gives a classification and analysis of all publicly
available hypervisor detection methods and
approaches.
The history of hypervisor detection started in
2007 after the first hypervisor rootkit “Blue Pill”
was presented by Rutkowska (2006). “Blue Pill”
is a Windows based driver for AMD CPU. At
the same time Dai Zovi (2006) released “Vitriol”
–
a similar hypervisor for MAC OS and Intel
CPU.
The comparative analysis of these two
hypervisors was presented by Fannon (2014).
“Blue Pill” and “Vitriol” became high-profile
tools in information security sphere and
motivated the creation a lot of different
approaches to hypervisor detection. Their
classification is given in Figure 2. We can
classify
these
into
four
categories:
signature-based, behavior-based, detection based
on the trusted hypervisor and approaches which
use time analysis. Signature based detection uses
memory scanning of hypervisors’ patterns. The
latter three sections are based on interaction with
a hypervisor.
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Способы обнаружения
Signature-based
By Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)

Behavior-based

By Errors in Hypervisors
By Errors in CPU

Based on the
trusted hypervisor
By Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)

Time-based

By Return Stack Buffer (RSB)
By Memory Access
By Unconditionally Intercepted Instructions

Figure 2 Hypervisor Detection Methods Classification
2.1. Signature-Based Detection
After a hypervisor has been loaded into memory
its dispatcher (VMM handler) and Virtual
Machine Control Structure (VMCS in Intel case)
will be located in memory. The hypervisor can be
detected by signature analysis of the physical
memory (Bulygin & Samyde, 2008; Desnos,
Filiol, & Lefou, 2011; Medley, 2007).
This approach consists of two stages: memory
dump and its inspection, both of which are not
resilient to the hypervisor’s countermeasures.
Analysis shows that software based memory dump
approaches are vulnerable whereas the hardware
ones are only applicable under laboratory
conditions (Korkin & Nesterov, 2014).
Let us analyze how resistant
hypervisor’s signatures are.

the

current

Thus Fritsch (2008) proposed to detect “Blue Pill”
hypervisor by searching “BLPB”, “BLUE” and
“BLUP” strings in a memory dump. However, in
common cases such strings will be unknown to
analysts.
The Actaeon system (Graziano, Lanzi, &
Balzarotti, 2013) is based on searching for VMCS
fragments. However, this method can sometimes
fail. For example, hypervisor can allocate in
memory 100 structures to hamper detection. These
VMCSes are similar to original VMCS. After that
the Actaeon system may reveal many false
VMCSes so separation between the original one
and the rest will require a considerable amount of
manual work.
As a result, signature-based detection is ineffective
for resistant hypervisors.
2.2. Behavior-Based Detection
Behavior-based detection relies on the system
activity differences in the two cases, with and
without a hypervisor. There are three
behavior-based detection methods: TLB-based
detection and methods based on errors in
hypervisors and errors in CPUs.
2.2.1. TLB-Based Detection. It is possible to
apply the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)
which is a memory cache used to speed address

translation to detect a hypervisor (Desnos et al.,
2011; Fritsch, 2008; Morabito, 2012; Wailly,
2014).
TLB includes a set of recently accessed virtual and
corresponding physical addresses. Every time OS
accesses memory a corresponding TLB entry is
searched for. If the requested virtual address is
present in the TLB, the retrieved physical address
will be used to access memory. In the other case
the longtime search with the help of Page
Directory will occur. This peculiarity will be
discussed later in Section 2.4.1.
It is known that VM Exit leads to ﬂushing of TLB
when a hypervisor is present. Otherwise without a
hypervisor such clearance does not occur. This is
why hypervisor detection reduces to checking
TLB content, which can be made in several ways,
for example by modifying page table entry (Myers
& Youndt, 2007).
However, TLB-based detection does not work on
AMD CPUs and new Intel CPUs. The new
supplementary TLB fields “ASID” and “PCID” do
not let VM exit flush TLB.
2.2.2. Detection Based on Bugs in CPU. A
hypervisor can be detected with the help of bugs in
certain CPU models. In these CPUs the results of
some instructions depend on whether or not a
hypervisor is present.
The “Erratum 140” in AMD CPU is based on
using results of “RDMSR 10h”. The original value
of time stamp counter (TSC) is returned by
“RDMSR 10h” while “RDTSC” gets the sum of
TSC value and VMCS.TSC_OFFSET value
(AMD, 2011).
Another bug “VMSAVE 0x67” freezes the
system. The execution of the VMSAVE
instruction with 0x67 prefix stops virtualization
system. Without a hypervisor this error does not
occur (Barbosa, 2007).
These detection methods are applicable only for
outdated CPUs and require non trivial adaptation
to new CPUs.
2.2.3. Detection Based on Bugs in Hypervisors.
There are software hypervisor bugs similar to
hardware bugs in CPU.

Microsoft published their paper “Hypervisor
Top-Level Functional Specification”, which
describes how to detect a hypervisor and get
“Hypervisor Vendor ID Signature”, by using
CPUID (O'Neill, 2010; Microsoft, 2013).
Spoofing attack is likely to occur, when a
hypervisor can replace data, trapped by CPUID
execution.
“Blue Pill” hypervisor has a built-in control
interface, which uses “Bpknock” hypercalls
(BluePillStudy, 2010; Fritsch, 2008). Calling
CPUID with EAX=0xbabecafe changes EAX to
0x69696969, if “Blue Pill” is present. Otherwise
such a change does not occur. Due to the
hypervisor’s built-in control interface it is possible
not only to detect, but also unload a hypervisor
(Gabris, 2009).
A hypervisor can also be detected by reading
debugging messages. For example, a developer or
hacker might have forgotten to remove DbgPrint
calls, which can disclose a hypervisor’s activity.
These approaches can reveal only well-known
hypervisors, which do not take countermeasures.
2.3. Detection Based on the Trusted Hypervisor
A hypervisor which is loaded first can control and
block activity of hypervisors which are loaded
later. This detection method was used in “McAfee
DeepSAFE” (McAfee, 2012), “Hypersight Rootkit
Detector” (North Security Labs, 2011), “Symantec
Endpoint Protection” (Korkin, 2012), and it has
also been mentioned in papers (Park, 2013; Wang
& Jiang, 2010).
This detection approach is vulnerable to
“Man-In-The-Middle” (MITM) attack, in which an
illegitimate hypervisor can gain control first and
compromise a legitimate one, which was loaded
later on. TPM-based attestation of hypervisor can
avoid this attack, although TMP mechanism is
vulnerable too (Berger et al., 2006; Brossard &
Demetrescu, 2012; Wojtczuk, & Rutkowska,
2009; Wojtczuk, Rutkowska, & Tereshkin, 2009).
MITM attack can be also prevented by loading
hypervisor from BIOS as well as by applying
Trusted Startup Hardware Module (Accord, 2010).
However, due to the difficulty of porting this
detection method, it is applicable only to labs.

2.4. Time-Based Detection
Time-based detection uses the measuring of time
duration of specific operations or profiling of its
execution time. When a hypervisor is present the
execution of such operations is intercepted by the
hypervisor. As a result, their duration will be
longer than without a hypervisor.
Four time-based methods can be mentioned: TLBand RSB-based detection, detection based on
memory access and detection by unconditionally
intercepted instructions. Let us focus on these
methods applicable in the situation where a
hypervisor prevents its detection by time cheating
and temporary self-uninstalling.
2.4.1. TLB-Based Detection. As it was mentioned
before in Section 2.2.1, the TLB flushes every
time VM exit occurs. After that, the longtime fill
will happen. It is possible to use this fact to detect
hypervisor as follows (Ramos, 2009; Rutkowska,
2007):
1. Read the content of a specific memory
address.
2. Repeat step 1 and measure its duration. In
this case the TLB entry, which was added
on step 1, will be used.
3. Execute
unconditionally
intercepted
instruction (forcing a #VMEXIT).
4. Repeatedly carry out step 2.
5. Make a conclusion about the hypervisor
presence by comparing the results of steps
2 and 4.
This approach does not work if the hypervisor uses
time cheating, because there is no significant
difference between these two steps. This approach
has the same disadvantages as in Section 2.2.1.
2.4.2. RSB-Based Detection. Another detection
method is based on Return Stack Buffer (RSB),
which increases computer performance. RSB
content as well as TLB suffers changes when
VM exit occurs, but unlike TLB, RSB includes
addresses of RET instructions.
Applying RSB to hypervisor detection was
described by Bulygin (2008) and later by Fritsch
(2008) and Athreya (2010). After 16 nested
functions calls, RSB will consist of 16
corresponding return addresses. The idea of the

detection lies in an attempt to fill the RSB buffer,
call VM-exit, for example by calling an
unconditionally intercepted instruction, measure
an execution time of these 16 functions. If a
hypervisor is present, it intercepts VM-Exit and
replaces a part of RSB entries. As a result the
whole duration will be longer than without a
hypervisor.
This method is vulnerable to the hypervisor’s
countermeasures, for example if a hypervisor
dispatcher has no sub-functions it is also
vulnerable to time cheating attack (Athreya, 2010).
2.4.3. Detection Based on Memory Access. A
hypervisor can prevent its signature detection by
controlling memory access (section 2.1.), which
increases the duration of memory access and can
be applied to hypervisor detection (Fisher-Ogden,
2006; Fritsch, 2008).
By walking successively through memory we
measure each time the duration of memory page
access. The memory region with excessive access
duration is the stealth memory region. This region
can consist of hypervisor dispatcher and
corresponding structures.
However, this method works only if the hypervisor
does not use time cheating for self-protection.
2.4.4. Detection by Unconditionally Intercepted
Instructions. It is known that the duration of
execution
of
unconditionally
intercepted
instructions increases after any hypervisor has
been loaded in the system. We can detect
hypervisor presence by comparing time duration
with some threshold values (Athreya, 2010;
Lakshminarayanan, Patel, Robinson, & Soulami,
2012).
Hardware virtualization for Intel CPU includes a
set of unconditionally intercepted instructions, e.
g. CPUID (Intel, 2014), for AMD CPU case we
can use RDMSR (Morabito, 2012), which has to
be triggered by a hypervisor. The authors suggest
measuring a HDD access time, RAM access time
or duration of cryptographic computation (Kyte,
Zavarsky, Lindskog, & Ruhl, 2012; Pek, &
Buttyan, 2014). But such events can only be
revealed by specialized hypervisors and does not
work in ordinary cases.

This detection approach is vulnerable to “Blue
Chicken”
technique
and
time
cheating
(Rutkowska, & Tereshkin, 2008). Nevertheless,
this approach appears to be the most attractive
because of its usability and portability. This
approach is also universal, as a hypervisor will
always spend time on VM Exits (VM Entries), and
this time needs to be hidden. Because of these
advantages this approach was chosen and was
significantly improved.
2.5. Analysis of Counters to Measure
Instruction Execution Time
Instruction execution time (IET) or its duration is
the main scope of this research, so let us classify
and analyze the capabilities of the computer
counters, which can be applied to measure, e.g. the
execution time of ten CPUID instructions.
Counters can be classified as software and
hardware ones. Hardware counters use device
capabilities and may be further classified as local
and remote ones.
The software counter (or SMP counter) is based on
simultaneous work of two loops (Desnos et al.,
2011; Jian, Huaimin, Shize, & Bo, 2010;
Morabito, 2012), which are running on different
CPU cores. The first thread increments the control
variable, while the second one executes the
unconditionally intercepted instruction in the loop,
for example 1000 times. The conclusion about
hypervisor presence is made by comparing the
results of a control variable with the threshold
value. One paper (Li, Zhu, Zhou, & Wang, 2011)
describes how to prevent this approach by
applying memory modification, which contains the
control variable.
To measure IET we can use the following
hardware counters TSC, RTC, ACPI Timer, APIC
Timer, HPET, PIT, local device counters, e.g.
GPU timer, and NTP-based clock. Our analysis
shows that all these counters apart from TSC and
SMP have low-resolution and cannot be used in
ordinary cases. SMP counting requires no less than
two CPU cores and can be cheated. The best
choice to measure the IET is TSC because of its
accuracy and high-resolution. TSC also works on
all CPUs. To eliminate the influence of other
running programs on IET, we can use TSC on the

highest IRQL and set the affinity of the measuring
code with one of the CPU cores.
The important advantage of TSC is the possibility
to cheat on it easily, so we can simulate a stealthy
hypervisor and test our detection approach in a
real case.
2.6. Conclusion
The above analysis shows that the existing
approaches and hypervisor detection tools have the
following drawbacks:
1. Signature-based approaches are vulnerable to
hypervisor countermeasures. Only Actaeon
project can detect nested hypervisors, but it
can also be compromised.
2. Behavior-based detection methods do not
reveal new hypervisors and do not work on
new CPUs.
3. Trusted
hypervisor-based
approach is
susceptible to MITM attack.
4. Time-based
detection
approaches
are
vulnerable to time cheating and Blue Chicken
technique.
Detection
by
unconditionally
intercepted
instructions is highly attractive, because it relies
on a generally applicable technique. By improving
data acquisition and processing, we can overcome
the drawbacks of this method.
3. THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
ENHANCEMENT OF TIME-BASED
DETECTION
Detection
by
unconditionally
intercepted
instructions works well only if a hypervisor does
not apply countermeasures: time cheating and
temporary self-uninstalling. In this section the
enhancement of this method is described.
Our prerequisites are based on specific features of
IET. One of them is the relation between the
average IET and presence of a hypervisor. Another
well-known one is a random nature of IET, but it
is still unclear how to use it in practice.

To grapple with this gap, let us look at the
switching schemes between different CPU
operating modes, which occur after OS is loaded.
We demonstrate and analyze what actually
happens when a set of CPUID instructions are
being executed in three cases: when the hypervisor
is present, not present and when several nested
ones are present.
Further we will focus on two IET characteristics:
dispersion of IET array and IET array layering.
According to some papers (Duflot, Etiemble, &
Grumelard, 2006; Embleton, Sparks, & Zou, 2008;
Zmudzinski, 2009) without a hypervisor a CPU
can operate in one of the two modes: either in the
Protected Mode (P-mode) or System Management
Mode (S-mode), which is depicted on Figure 3, a.
System Management Interrupt (SMI) switches
from the P- to S-mode, CPU leaves S-mode and
returns to the previous mode by using RSM
instruction.
We can conclude that CPU is a stochastic system
with random transitions between states, because of
a random nature of SMI. Therefore IET is a
random value determined by the number of SMI.
After the hypervisor is loaded the CPU can switch
between the three modes. As in the previous case
the P- and S- modes are present but an additional
VMX root mode (V-mode) is added, so the
P-mode is named as VMX non root mode (Intel,
2014). The P-mode is accepted as the main one,
S-mode is duplicated for better clarity, see
Figure 3, b. Execution of each CPUID instruction
in P-mode always leads to switching to the Vmode (VM Exit), and after execution it switches
back to the P-mode. Switching to the S-mode
might occur either from P-mode or from V-mode.
Similarly to the previous case we may assume that
CPU works as a stochastic system, but switching
to the V-mode enhances its random nature. As a
result switching increases the average value of IET
as well as the variability of IET.

Protected mode
(P-mode)

SMI
RSM

VMX non root mode
(P-mode)

System
Management
Mode
(S-mode)

SMI

VM exit
VM entry

RSM

VMX root mode
(V-mode)
SMI

RSM

System
Management Mode
(S1-mode)

System
Management Mode
(S-mode)

a
b
Figure 3 Switching between Modes in Two Cases: (a) without a Hypervisor, (b) with One Hypervisor
CPU works in a similar way in cases when several
hypervisors are present (Ben-Yehuda et al., 2010).
CPU can also switch between three modes, but the
situation will be different because of several
hypervisors dispatchers, see Figure 4.
In this case execution of each CPUID instructions
in P-mode always leads to switching to the Vmode, and further, each hypervisor’s dispatcher is
successively called beginning from dispatcher #1
to dispatcher #2 etc. to dispatcher #e and
backwards. Finally execution will switch to Pmode. S-mode can gain control at any point. Now,
CPU also works as a stochastic system, but
participation
of several nested dispatchers significantly
lengthens the time of execution and increases IET
variability. These schemes allow us to discover
that the root of randomness of IET is actually the
randomness of SMI.
Suppose that probability or frequency of SMI is
a constant. After a hypervisor is loaded, due to the
increased IET the number of SMI is increased as

well. That is why the dispersion of IET will
increase after a hypervisor is loaded and this fact
can be used for detection. During the execution of
a set of CPUID the number of SMI is limited. If
we repeat measuring of IET in a loop we can see
that some of its values are repeated. Hence array
of IET values can be grouped by sets with the
same values (for details see Chapter 4). As a
result, we can see that the array of IET values has
a layered nature in all described cases. The
number of layers will increase after a hypervisor is
loaded and this fact can also be used for
hypervisor detection.
The revealed IET variability indexes, variance
(or second moment) and number of layers
(or spectral width) are resilient to time cheating.
Hypervisor can only decrease the mean value of
IET but not the variability characteristics.
As a first approximation this analysis reveals two
theoretical hypervisor indicators. This result is
based on a hypothesis but now has to be
comprehensively verified by experiments.
VMX root mode (V-mode)

VMX non root mode
(P-mode)
SMI

RSM

System
Management Mode
(S-mode)

VM exit
VM entry

Hypervisor’s
dispatcher #1
SMI

VM exit
VM entry

.. ..

VM exit
VM entry

Hypervisor’s
dispatcher #e

RSM

System
Management Mode
(S1-mode)

SMI

RSM

System
Management Mode
(Se-mode)

Figure 4 Switching between Modes with Several Nested Hypervisors

4. INSTRUCTION EXECUTION TIME
RESEARCH & NEW STEALTH
HYPERVISORS DETECTION
ALGORITHMS
Probabilistic hypervisor detection is discussed in
following papers (Desnos et al., 2011; Fritsch,
2008; Jian et al., 2010; Morabito, 2012). All these
methods work only if a hypervisor is not hiding
itself. What is more, these papers do not give
enough attention to the random nature of IET.
Detection of stealthy hypervisors faces two
challenges: time cheating and data fluctuations,
which will be described in this paper.
4.1. Experiments on Measurements of
Instruction Execution Time
To detect a hypervisor we improve the detection
method, which uses unconditionally intercepted
instructions. We analyze IET sets in the two cases
with a hypervisor and without any.
Experimental data was received by measuring a
set of ten CPUID instructions by using RDTSC in
a loop in Windows driver, see Figure 5. To
dismiss the influence of other apps and drivers in
the OS we ensured thread affinity with certain
CPU core and raise IRQL to its maximum level. It
is also possible to use deferred procedure call
(DPC) to achieve an exclusive access to the
hardware. An example of this scheme is described
by Blunden (2012).
We use CPUID instruction as an unconditionally
intercepted one by any Intel-based hypervisor and
also as a serializing instruction which prevents
out-of-order execution (Fog, 2014; Intel, 1998).

Our proof-of-concept hypervisor (PoC hypervisor)
is based on the VMM framework by Embleton
(2007) with an added TSC cheating function.
There are three different ways to cheat TSC: by
TSC_OFFSET field in VMCS, catching execution
of RDTSC or CPUID. We chose the last one: our
hypervisor decreases the TSC's value every time
CPUID is executed. This hypervisor's dispatcher is
the smallest. By cheating TSC we can make sure
that the average values of IET are the same to
within one clock tick, whether the hypervisor is
present or not. Therefore, this is the most complex
case for detection.
To obtain data we used two nested loops. An
example of an inner loop is shown on Figure 5, it
was executed 1000 times without any delays.
Outer loop was executed 10 times with a twosecond delay between each iteration. The results of
this experiment were recorded to a 1000x10 array
(see Table 1); the columns contain data from inner
loops.
According to ISO 5725 repeatability requirements
we repeated the complete experiment five times
with a two-second delay between each iteration.
To control reproducibility of data we checked the
results on 10 different days. All in all for this
period we measured 50 arrays of 1000x10, which
will be further processed. That period was
sufficient to reduce variation intervals of statistics:
average values, variance etc.
Six PCs were involved in testing, see Table 2. In
the first five PCs we used our PoC hypervisor, and
in the last PC we used a specialized hypervisor
loaded by BIOS – TRace EXplorer (TREX) by
Tichonov and Avetisyan (2011).

KeSetSystemAffinityThread(affinity)
KfRaiseIrql(HIGH_LEVEL)
for (...)
{
RDTSC
MOV hst, EDX
MOV lst, EAX
CPUID // 1
...
CPUID // 10
RDTSC
MOV hfin, EDX
MOV lfin, EAX
save_time(hst, lst, hfin, lfin)
}

Figure 5 Code Fragment for Obtaining Data

Table 1 Example of Array of Measured IET without a Hypervisor
Measurement no
1
2
…
1000
Average of a column
Variance of a column

1
2896
2896
…
2888
2895
1738

Inner loop iteration
2
…
2888
…
2888
…
…
…
2888
…
2888
…
1267
…

10
2896
2880
…
2888
2888
1196

Table 2 CPU Models and OS Versions
PC#
1
2
3
4
5
6

CPU models and OS versions
Intel Core 2 Duo E6300 / Windows 7
Intel Core 2 Duo E8200 / Windows 7
Intel Core 2 Duo E8600 / Windows Live CD XP
Intel Core i7 950 / Windows XP
Intel Xeon X5600 / Windows 7
AMD Phenom X4 945 / Windows Live CD XP

4.2. Probabilistic Nature of Instruction
Execution Time
Desnos, Filiol and Lefou (2011) suggested that the
instruction execution time is normally distributed
and there are no problems with precision
(repeatability and reproducibility) of the
measurement data.
However, all our experiments on different PCs
showed that the measurement data are nonnormally distributed. There are no well-known
distribution patterns which these data would
match. Moreover, data fluctuation is so large that
mean and variance statistics differ significantly
between sets of experiments. Therefore the
precision of the measurement data does not
comply with ISO 5725 (2004) requirements.
We have to take into consideration that outliers
and jumps (discontinuity) are very common,
which will alter statistical values, see Figure 6. A
possible reason for outliers and jumps is the
pipeline of instructions. Due to the fact that the
time measurement procedure is quite simple and a
PoC hypervisor with time cheating can be used,
we can receive an abundance of experimental data

for research and detection phase, which
significantly helps. Relying on the probabilistic
nature of IET we dealt with when setting up
experiments, these revealed data peculiarities,
processing of preliminary data, only appeared after
that we applied statistical methods.
4.3. Peculiarities of Instruction Execution Time
and Ways of Hypervisors Detection
Our experiments confirmed the following:
1. IET measured by TSC is a random value,
which depends on a CPU model, OS version
and on whether or not a hypervisor is present.
2. The average and variance of IET arrays are
larger if a hypervisor is present than if it is not.
3. The difference between average and variance
of IET arrays becomes more significant after
every new nested hypervisor has been loaded.
We can easily and reliably detect a non-hidden
hypervisor by just comparing the average values
of IET arrays. The average values of IET arrays
with a non-hidden hypervisor are almost 10 times
larger than without it.
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Figure 6 Scatter Plot of IET Array Fragment with One Outlier and Jump
But a hypervisor can apply time cheating
technique and as a result the average values of IET
will be the same as corresponding values without a
hypervisor. There are no time-based detection
methods which work well under such
circumstances. Our experiments were focused on
this challenging case.
Using more common statistical methods in
hypervisor detection proved to be inapplicable.
The reasons will be given below.
By using statistics we can determine if there is a
statistically significant difference between two sets
of data. We already know which of the set will be
measured with exposure and without it.
But in the current situation we have several sets.
We can connect several sets to a big one, and use
classical approaches, but such operation has to be
proved. For this case there are no proven statistical
methods.
Applying current approaches to determine
significant difference between the sets did not
yield any positive results for a variety of reasons.
We can consider the columns of arrays as a
random sample, also as a result of the random
process. It is impossible to use the first method,
because of the fluctuation of measurements and
lack of homogeneity. The second method is not
applicable either, because of overlapping variation
intervals and instability of characteristics.

We see that homogeneity of variances (HOV) is
violated in all our experimental data, and as a
result we cannot use analysis of variance
(ANOVA) in data processing.
We conclude that methods of parametric and nonparametric statistics are not applicable in the
current situation. That is why we developed the
following methods, including the present author’s
approaches:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Low-frequency filtration.
Calculation of experimental probability.
Two-step way to calculate statistics.
Variation interval as confidence interval.
Iteration of measurements if the statistical
value is at the intersection of two variation
intervals.

Due to filtration we can decrease fluctuation and
stabilize variation characteristics.
Due to calculation of experimental probability we
can find threshold values and so minimize type I
and II errors.
We choose a two-step way of calculating in order
to reduce overlapping of these characteristic
intervals.
To calculate a confidence interval we choose the
idea of the confidence interval method of Strelen
(2004) and Kornfeld (1965), in which a confidence
interval is calculated as a variation interval or

difference between maximum (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 ) and
minimum (𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ) values of statistic. The
confidence level is the following 𝑃{𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≪ 𝜃 <
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 } = 1 − 0.5𝑛−1 , where ‘𝑛’ is the length of a
sample.
We have to study a situation when a calculated
statistical value will be at the intersection of two
variation intervals. In this situation it is impossible
to decide whether a hypervisor is present or not. In
this case we have to repeat measurements of IET
arrays and calculations of statistics. In accordance
with the multiplication theorem recurrent hits in
the intersection zone are very unlikely.
4.3.1. Applying Layered Structure of IET
Arrays to Hypervisors Detection. Numerous
experiments show that IET arrays have a layered
structure. It means that each IET array is
comprised of several layers, whose characteristics
depend on CPU, OS and whether or not a
hypervisor is present.
First of all our experiments confirm, that the
number of layers with a hypervisor is larger than
without a hypervisor.
To make it clear, the results of an experiment are
given below. We measured IET arrays in two
cases: without hypervisor and with it.
The right part of Figure 7 is a scatter plot of the
IET array; each point corresponding to the
measured duration of ten CPUID instructions.
Experiment numbers are on the x-axis, while IET
values are displayed on the y-axis.
Blue color corresponds to IET without a
hypervisor, red color corresponds to IET with a
hypervisor, which is applying time cheating. This
technique leads to getting approximately the same
mean value if hypervisor is present with the mean
value without a hypervisor.
The left part of Figure 7 shows the corresponding
frequency polygons or relative frequency chart.
We can see that with a hypervisor the number of
polygon points (or number of layers) is larger than
without a hypervisor.
The similar nature of polygons was also noted by
Morabito (2012). His observations show that the
data is generally not normally distributed and
skewed, long-tailed data with outliers is fairly

common. Similar plots of IET array fragments are
given in the paper by Fritsch (2008) in the part
“A.4 Empirical results” and by Li, Zhu, Zhou, &
Wang (2011). However, the fact that layered
structure could be used for hypervisor detection
had not been mentioned.
If several hypervisors are present, the layering
structure of IET arrays is still obvious. We
measured IET arrays in four different cases:
without hypervisor (black), with only own PoC
hypervisor (green), with only Acronis hypervisor
(blue) and with two nested hypervisors (red). The
scatter plots of the corresponding IET arrays are
shown on Figure 8.
To make it clear, the scatter plots are spaced
vertically. We can see that without a hypervisor
the plot consists of only one line with quite rare
jumps. If PoC hypervisor is present, the
corresponding plot has 2-3 layers with significant
jumps. The situation is similar if only Acronis
hypervisor is present. If two nested hypervisors are
present we can see that the plot becomes a cloud
of points, there are a lot of layers with low
frequency.
The best way to reveal the number of layers is to
use the frequency distribution of measured IET
arrays. We calculate frequency distribution with
each class for one value or without intervals of
numbers. Number of layers equals the number of
classes.
It is possible to detect a stealth hypervisor, which
uses the Blue Chicken technique. Temporary
self-uninstalling of this hypervisor originally
occurs after 50-100 measurements of IET because
hypervisor needs to recognize time-based
detection. As a result we will see the changed
nature of the scatter plot: the first 50-100
measurements will have a layered nature and the
remaining portion of measurements will have just
1-2 layers because the hypervisor has already been
uninstalled. This changing of the scatter plot will
be repeated in the next columns; because they
were measured with a two-second delay.
However, our experiments show that direct use of
these indicators is problematic for two reasons.
These characteristics are not always constant (they
are unstable) and also variation ranges of these
characteristics overlap each other whether

hypervisor is present or not. Later we will discuss

how to deal with it.
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4.3.2. Applying Second and Fourth Moments to
Hypervisors Detection. All our experiments also
confirmed the following result of section 3. After
hypervisor is loaded the numerical values that
measure the spread of IET arrays will increase.
We obtained good results with the second and
fourth moments. Moreover, after loading each
nested hypervisor these sample characteristics
increase, which is clearly seen in Figure 8.
Experiments show that the sixth and higher
moments of IET arrays are seriously inaccurate.
As mentioned before, outliers and jumps
(discontinuity) significantly affected values of the
second and fourth moments. That is why it is
impossible to achieve a stable distinction between
sample characteristics and draw a conclusion as to
whether a hypervisor is present or not. Negative
impacts of these factors can be eliminated by
simultaneously applying three techniques: fitting,
low-frequency filtering and “length-averaging”.
We get sample characteristics before and after an
outlier and calculate the final value by averaging
of the corresponding fragments lengths for
“length-averaging”.
In order to reduce overlapping of these
characteristics intervals we chose a two-step way
of calculating. We calculate the second and fourth
moments for each column in the table (IET array),
see Table 1. This brings us to a set of these
characteristics, which we consider as a new
sample and repeatedly calculate characteristics of
this set.
In other words, from the primary column of IET
array we get the secondary characteristics, which
we are processes by statistical methods.
Consequently this helps us to significantly reduce
or avoid the overlapping of new characteristics
intervals.
All theoretical principles from Section 3 were
successfully confirmed by experiment. The
number of layers of IET arrays, second and fourth
moments increased and remained on the same
increased level after a new hypervisor was loaded,
i.e. they can be used to detect a hypervisor and
several nested ones. Moreover the ways of
calculating threshold values of each statistic will

be given with
fluctuations.

due

consideration

of

data

4.4. How to Calculate Threshold Values of
Statistics to Detect Hypervisors
Hypervisor detection includes comparison of
calculated statistics values with threshold values.
If statistical values are greater than threshold
values, we conclude that a hypervisor is present,
otherwise there is no hypervisor. The main goal is
to find a suitable filtration level and the statistic,
which has an appropriate threshold value or
minimal sum of type I and type II errors.
To calculate threshold values we have to measure
50 arrays 1000x10 for two cases when a
hypervisor is present or not, 100 arrays in total.
We use own PoC hypervisor, because it contains
the minimal set of instructions in CPUID
dispatcher and its only role is TSC cheating. This
is the most difficult case. PoC hypervisor’s
threshold values will help to detect any other
hypervisor with more functions, as it will cause
more changes to IET variation.
Calculating threshold values includes calculating
statistics in two ways after low frequency filtering
with the following levels {0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15,
0.2} or {0%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%}.
One way is to calculate statistics for each column
1000x1 of a 1000x10 array. After this calculation
we analyzed the received set of 10 values as a new
sample and then averaged them (𝑙 ̅ – “averaged
columns value”).
Another way is to calculate statistics for one big
column 10,000x1 obtained from an array 1000x10
by vectorizing (Vectorization (mathematics),
2014) (𝑙𝑣 – “vectorized array value”).
It should not be forgotten that outliers and jumps
(discontinuity) significantly change statistics
values and therefore we have to delete them. We
find a jump as the maximum value in the first
order difference (The Scipy Community, 2009).
The threshold value of a jump is 300 CPU ticks,
which can then be corrected.
The calculation algorithm of threshold values is
the same for all statistics and includes three steps:

1. Receive and process IET array every day.
Receive preliminary results.
2. Process the preliminary results which are
obtained for 10 days. Receive threshold values
and probabilities of type I and II error.
3. Create the final table with all appropriate
statistics.
We are going to describe a way to calculate
threshold values of a new statistic – a number of
layers.
The first step is to filter each column from Table 1
with different filtration levels. For each received

column we calculate the number of layers.
Calculated values are given in corresponding
columns in Table 3.
The last but one column in Table 3 includes the
mean values of the number of layers for each
filtration level. For example the first value 12 is
(28+29+...+10)/10. The last column includes the
values of the number of layers, which were
calculated from the column 10,000x1 for each
filtration level. E.g. the first value 53 means the
number of layers in the array 10,000x1 after its
filtration with level 0%.

Table 3 Example of Calculating the Number of Layers If no Hypervisor is Present
Filtering
level
0
0.02
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2

Values of the number of layers
for each column in array
1000x10
1
2
…
10
28
29
…
10
4
3
…
3
3
3
…
3
2
2
…
3
1
2
…
2
1
2
…
2

Averaged
columns value,
𝑙̅

Vectorized
array value, 𝑙𝑣

12
4
3
3
2
2

53
6
6
3
3
2

Table 4 Number of Layers of IET Arrays for 2 Cases when a Hypervisor is Present and not
Code of
experiments

day #1 (Ig10)

day #10 (Ig19)

Variation intervals
Threshold values
Type I error
Type II error

No hypervisor
Averaged
Vectorized
columns value, 𝑙 ̅ array value, 𝑙𝑣
5
23
4
18
4
15
5
21
4
15

Hypervisor is present
Averaged
Vectorized
columns value, 𝑙 ̅ array value, 𝑙𝑣
11
47
11
52
10
34
13
53
14
68

...

…

…

…

4
6
6
6
10
[4, 14]
≤7
0.04
0

20
32
32
32
50
[10, 110]
≤ 32
0.12
0.16

19
15
16
20
21
[8, 21]
≥8
–
–

102
77
79
88
105
[29,105]
≥ 33
–
–

We can see that with filtration level “0.1”
the values of 𝑙 ̅ and 𝑙𝑣 are stabilized, therefore we
will use this filtration level for this PC in the
future. The similar table is also created if PoC
hypervisor is present. Four numbers, values 𝑙 ̅ and
𝑙𝑣 in two cases when a hypervisor is present or not
present, are evaluated from a single 1000x10 array
in each case.
This procedure was repeated for each of five
arrays 1000x10 every day, for 10 days.
After that we create a preliminary table with
threshold values and type I and II errors, see
Table 4.
Stabilization of statistics is obvious in both cases
when a hypervisor is present and not. We managed
to achieve this stabilization only due to filtration
of jumps and length-averaging, as previously
mentioned.
Variation intervals were determined according to
minimum and maximum values of the statistics in
the columns. Variation intervals overlap, therefore
if statistical values get into this overlapping, it is
impossible to reliably detect a hypervisor. In these
cases we have to repeat IET array measurements.
We chose threshold values so that the sum of
probability of type I and II errors was minimal.
Type I error means that we conclude that the
hypervisor is there according to calculations, while
actually it is not there. The probability of a
type I error is experimentally calculated as a
number of values, which are greater than the
threshold value. A type II error means that we
conclude that the hypervisor is not there, while
actually it is there. The probability of this error is
also experimentally calculated as a number of
values, which is smaller than the threshold value.
In other words, we calculate the probability of
type I and II errors with this formula 𝑟⁄𝑔 , where
‘𝑟’ is the number of values in the column, which
are outside the threshold, 𝑔 = 50 is the total
number of values in the column. For detection we
used only those statistics, whose sum of type I and
II errors are less than 0.2 (or 20%).
Below is a fragment of the final table (Table 5)
with all appropriate statistics for all tested PCs
from Table 2.

𝑇̅ is the average value of IET from all arrays
without a hypervisor and all other statistical
notations are below in Table 6. As mentioned
above we can calculate the statistics in two ways:
for each column and after vectorization.
Our research findings suggest that threshold values
depend on Windows version. For the same
hardware threshold values for Windows XP and
Windows 7 are different, variation intervals of
statistics on Windows XP are smaller than on
Windows 7. This occurs because Windows 7
enables more SMI handlers than Windows XP.
We performed similar experimental checks for
nested hypervisors. We used the following
iteration algorithm:
1. First, we obtained threshold values for the
case without a hypervisor. To do this we
measured IET arrays without a hypervisor and
with our PoC hypervisor. We received that
𝐿 ≤ 31 (number of layers) means there is no
hypervisor. The probability of a false positive
is 0.14. 𝐿 ≥ 32 means a hypervisor is present.
The probability of false negative is 0.06.
2. Secondly, we installed Acronis Disk Director,
which loaded its own hypervisor. In the same
way we obtained threshold values for this
case. To do this we measured IET arrays with
only the Acronis hypervisor and with two
nested hypervisors: PoC and Acronis. We
found out that 𝐿 ≤ 67 or more precisely
32 ≤ 𝐿 ≤ 67 means that only the Acronis
hypervisor is present. 𝐿 ≥ 86 means that two
nested hypervisors simultaneously work.
Probabilities of type I and II errors in the latter
case is 0.
Table 7 includes the threshold values for all
mentioned cases.

Table 5 Final Table with all Appropriate Statistics
PC

Statistics

Filtration
level

𝑇̅
𝐿̅
̅
𝐷
̅
𝑀
𝜇
𝑇̅
𝐿̅
̅
𝐷
̅
𝑀
𝑇̅
𝐿̅
̅
𝐷
𝜇
𝑇̅
𝐿̅
̅
𝐷
𝑇̅
𝐿̅
̅
𝐷
𝑇̅
𝐿̅
𝑙̅
̅
𝐷
𝑑
̅
𝑀

0
0
0
0.1
0.1
0
0
0.2
0.2
0
0
0.1
0.1
0
0
0.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0,02

1

2

3

4

5

6

Threshold values
No
Hypervisor
hypervisor
is present
≤ 2911
–
≤7
≥8
≤ 14
≥ 18
≤ 679
≥ 947
≤ 104161
≥ 111041
≤ 2492
–
≤ 11
≥ 12
≤ 100
≥ 101
≤ 168
≥ 13030
≤ 2431
–
≤6
≥8
≤ 15
≥ 41
≤ 609
≥ 3410
≤ 5018
–
≤ 22
≥ 26
≤ 177
≥ 181
≤ 2852
–
≤ 67
≥ 71
≤ 16416
≥ 48920
≤ 2126
–
≤ 34
≥ 241
≤ 134
≥ 593
≤ 216
≥ 5478
≤ 345
≥ 5422
≤ 54
≥ 956

Probability
Type I
Type II
error
error
–
–
0.04
0
0.02
0
0.02
0
0.02
0.10
–
–
0.1
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.14
0.02
–
–
0
0
0
0
0
0
–
–
0.02
0.02
0.1
0.1
–
–
0.04
0
0
0
–
–
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 6 Statistical Notations
Averaged columns value

Vectorized array value

Number of layers

𝐿̅

𝑙

nd

2 central moment

̅
𝐷

𝑑

4th central moment

̅
𝑀

𝜇

4.5. Detection of Stealthy Hypervisors
According to experiments the detection
of hypervisors goes in two stages: through
preliminary and operational stages, see Table 8.
First of all we have to make sure that there is no
hypervisor in BIOS. To achieve this we

update/flash BIOS with a known and trusted
image. Malware in BIOS can prevent its updating
by software utility. That is why the best way to
overwrite BIOS is to desolder a microchip from
the motherboard, flash it by hardware programmer
and solder it back (Muchychka, 2013).

Table 7 Threshold Values for Two Nested Hypervisors
Threshold
values
𝐿 ≤ 31
32 ≤ 𝐿 ≤ 67
𝐿 ≥ 86

Conclusion about hypervisors and
their numbers
No hypervisor
Only Acronis hypervisor is present
Two nested hypervisors are present

Type I error

Type II error

0.14
0
0

0
0.06
0

Table 8 Detection of Stealthy Hypervisors
Stages
Preliminary

Operational
(detection)

Stage description
1. Flash BIOS with a trusted image or firmware.
2. Install OS.
3. Get threshold values for no hypervisor case.
4. Check in a loop if a hypervisor is present.
5. Install supplementary software (optional).
6. Monitor messages about a hypervisor presence.
7. To adapt the tool to new legitimate hypervisor go to 3.

In the second step we install OS. We have to use
official images to be certain that OS images do not
include any malware or illegitimate hypervisors.
Additionally OS components may be checked, e.g.
by reverse-engineering.
In the third step we get threshold values by using
PoC hypervisor. This step was described above.
In the fourth step we run the hypervisor presence
check in an infinite loop. We measure IET arrays
in a loop and compare calculated statistics with
threshold values, which were calculated in step 3.
We successively check if a hypervisor is present
on each CPU physical core.

program. However in more complicated cases we
have to check all the system components including
the BIOS image.
All source codes of getting threshold values, PoC
hypervisor and detection tool are here
(Korkin, 2014). The tool for getting threshold
values consists of two parts: subsystem for IET
arrays acquisition (C++) and subsystem for
threshold values calculation (MATLAB). PoC
hypervisor was developed using С++ and ASM,
and it is compiled with Visual Studio. The
detection tool consists of two parts: subsystem for
IET arrays acquisition and subsystem for threshold
values checks by MATLAB.

On the fifth and sixth steps we install
supplementary software and monitor messages
about new hypervisors.

5. CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSIONS AND
FUTURE WORK

If we get a message about new hypervisors after a
program installation, we check if this hypervisor is
legitimate. The approaches how to do this are
beyond the scope of this paper. It may be noted
that we can do it by calling corresponding support
service etc. Once we conclude that the hypervisor
is legitimate, we have to adapt the detection tool
by obtaining new threshold values (step 3). If we
conclude that the hypervisor is illegitimate, it must
be removed from the system. In some cases this is
solved by just uninstalling the previously installed

1. Hypervisor detection is a well-known
challenge. Malware with hypervisor facilities
are serious information security threats. Many
authors and companies are trying to tackle this
challenge.
2. In this paper we focused on and improved
time based detection by unconditionally
intercepted instructions. We studied the case
when a hypervisor uses time cheating and
temporary self-uninstalling to prevent its
detection. For this situation appropriate time

based approaches are not available on the
Internet. Only the described methods are able
to detect stealthy hypervisors in all known
countermeasures: time-cheating etc.
3. We explored the probability characteristics of
instruction execution time and proposed a new
technique for the detection of a hypervisor and
several nested ones.
4. We developed techniques for calculating
threshold values of various statistics and a
step-by-step guide on how to detect a
hypervisor.
5. These methods work well on different PCs
with both Intel and AMD CPUs and detected
PoC hypervisor and special BIOS hypervisor.
5.1. Hypervisor Detection without Flashing
BIOS and Reinstalling OS
The proposed hypervisor detection method (or its
preliminary starting procedure) needs to stop
system activity to flash BIOS, reinstall OS etc. But
for some systems this interruption of work is
prohibited or impossible. However, on the basic of
our experimental results, we can guarantee no
hypervisor presence without performing 1-2 steps
and unwanted system shutdown. To achieve this
we acquire IET arrays on PC, which is already in
operation. If after IET arrays filtering step we get
1-2 stable layers, this will mean that there is no
hypervisor. This peculiarity occurs on PCs with
Windows XP and should be investigated further.
5.2. Applying Numerical Values of Layers for
Hypervisor Detection
We have discovered another pattern which can be
used to detect a hypervisor. Thus most of our
experiments numerical values of layers are unique.
For example, in Figure 7 we see that numerical
values of different layers after filtering indicate
hypervisor presence. We achieve the following
numerical values of layers without hypervisor
{2160, 2168, 2184, 2192, 2200, 2478, 2480, 2880,
2888, 2904, 2920, 2936} and these values {2876,
2884, 2892, 2900, 2908, 2916, 2924} with PoC
hypervisor. We see that these two sets do not
contain equal values. Moreover, if a hypervisor
cheats TSC so that the first members from each set
are equal, the second and the next members from
the above sets will differ. This happens because of
the differences of deltas in each set {8, 24, 32, 40,

318, 320, 720, 728, 744, 760, 776} and {8, 16, 24,
32, 40, 48}.
The reasons for this difference and its resilience to
hypervisor countermeasures requires further
research.
5.3. Ways to Develop Computer Forensics and
Statistics for Universities
The proposed statistical methods and tools for
hypervisor detection can be used in two different
disciplines. Firstly, it may become a part of
Computer Forensics Discipline, when students can
acquire practical skills working with hardware
virtualization technology. PoC hypervisor can be
used as a basic platform for further improvements;
for example to create an event tracing tool which
will monitor low-level events and will be resilient
to modern malware. Hypervisor detection tools
can be used to invent new detection approaches,
based for example on all unconditionally
intercepted instructions (CPUID, INVD, MOV
from/to CR3, all VMX instructions, RDMSR and
WRMSR). These may have different parameters,
including wrong or invalid parameters, as well as
profiling execution time for different sets and
sequences of instructions, not just ten CPUIDs as
is described in this paper. Analysis of time of
physical memory access can be applied to find
time anomalies due to possible hidden objects.
Such a detection approach may need checking all
the memory pages, including valid and invalid
addresses. We compare IET characteristics before
and after disabling the CPU’s cache control
mechanism. A stealth hypervisor has to cheat TSC
with different deltas for each case, which does not
always occur.
Secondly it may become a part of a course in
“Statistics and Data Analysis”. Because of its
opportunity to acquire a lot of real experimental
data sets students can acquire practical experience
of data processing and its analysis. They can learn
how to solve repeatability and reproducibility
problems. They can apply different statistical
criteria to test correlations between arrays for
different cases: with a hypervisor and without it.
As a result students will not only better understand
the theoretical materials of the course, but will
also acquire new practical skills and apply them in
their own research.

5.4. Applying Hidden BIOS Hypervisor to
Track Stolen Laptops
It is well known that an organization has to pay
heavily every time an employee’s laptop is lost or
stolen. The idea is to create a software agent which
will track a laptop, block it if it is stolen, control it
remotely etc. This tool will work like Computrace
LoJack by Absolute Software (2014). The key
moment is to create a software agent, which will
be really hard to detect, delete and block. By using
hardware virtualization technology we can create a
hypervisor, which works permanently. To
guarantee that autorun works well, it will be
loaded from BIOS. This hypervisor can hide
memory areas and prevent its own rewriting by
software tools with the help of Shadow Page
Tables for AMD CPUs or Extended Page Tables
for Intel CPUs. This hypervisor can be easily
planted in any PC which supports hardware
virtualization. To facilitate development of this
hypervisor we can use open source software
components, for example Coreboot (2014) for
BIOS firmware, TianoCore (2014) for UEFI and
XEN (The Xen Project, 2014) as a basis for this
hypervisor.
5.5. Applying Hypervisor as USB Firewall to
prevent BadUSB attack
Nohl and Lell (2014) presented an idea and
prototype of malware USB stick. The idea lies in
reprogramming a USB device in order to add new
unauthorized functions. As a result, for example, a
reprogrammed USB stick will work as a USB
keyboard and by running malware commands can
take over a computer. This vulnerability is really
serious because this USB device works
transparently for user and AVs and formatting
USB flash does not erase malware firmware.
We can solve this challenge by using a
hypervisor’s facilities, which will control all the
devices access to the PC. By applying manual
configuration mode the hypervisor can block
malware activities of such devices. It will look as
if a hypervisor is playing the role of a USB
firewall. For example, after a USB device plugs
into the computer port the hypervisor will display
the list of all registered devices and allow the user
to choose the appropriate position. After that the
hypervisor will control the work of all USB

devices according to the access policies of these
devices. As a result this hypervisor working as
USB firewall can guarantee protection of PCs
from BadUSB attack or other malware USB
devices.
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